

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0352

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF EXCLUSIONS
OF FRENCH FORCES FROM DATA AND THE COMMON CEILING

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PAPER ON THE IMPLICATIONS
OF EXCLUSIONS OF FRENCH FORCES FROM WESTERN DATA AND THE
COMMON CEILING WHICH WAS AGREED BY FRG, UK, AND US REPS
ON JULY 3. THE PAPER IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND
FOR FORTHCOMING TRILATERAL AND OTHER POSSIBLE DISCUSSION
OF THE FRENCH ISSUE.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ON 20 NOVEMBER 1973, ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM
THE NATO COUNCIL, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS PRESENTED TO THE
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EAST A TOTAL FIGURE FOR ALL WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER

IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS INCLUDING THE FRENCH. THIS TOTAL WAS INTENDED TO INDICATE THE BASE FROM WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD REDUCE. ALSO UNDER NATO COUNCIL INSTRUCTIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS PROPOSED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973 A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON ALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, WHICH THEY SUGGESTED BE SET AT A LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE.

2. ON 1 APRIL 1974, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES EXPLICITLY INFORMED THE EAST THAT FRENCH FORCES WOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE COMMON CEILING. AT THE SAME TIME, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MADE CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT INCUR ANY OBLIGATIONS UNDER AN AGREEMENT. THEY MADE CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND THESE PARTICIPANTS ONLY, WOULD UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS AND WOULD BE COLLECTIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMON CEILING AT THE AGREED LEVEL, IF NECESSARY BY DROPPING THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES TO MAKE UP FOR FRENCH INCREASES.

3. THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF ALL THESE ACTIONS TAKEN WITH THE EAST. AT NO TIME DID THEY REQUEST THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD REVISE THESE STATEMENTS.

4. SINCE 17 JUNE 1976, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE SAID THEY ARE NO LONGER PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE INCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY IN (A) DATA TABLED BY THE WEST AND (B) THE COMMON CEILING.

5. TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD REQUIRE THE ABANDONMENT OF THE AGREED WESTERN NEGOTIATING APPROACH, WHICH IS BASED ON A ANALYSIS BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING WOULD BE UNWORKABLE WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE FRG. NOT ONLY WOULD EXTRACTION OF THE FRENCH FROM THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING BE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION, IT COULD ALSO GIVE RISE TO CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WEST WHICH WOULD BE MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE. INTER ALIA, ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING EASTERN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A DEFINITE LEVEL. THE REASONS FOR THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

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6. IF THE CORRENT NATO FIGURE FOR WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (791,000) OMITTED THE FRENCH, IT WOULD BE REDUCED TO 731,000. TO MAINTAIN THE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA AT AN EQUAL LEVEL ON EACH SIDE, BUT TO OMIT FRANCE FROM THE COMMON CEILING LIMITATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THERE WOULD THEN BE TWO POSSIBILITIES, A LEVEL OF 700,000 AND A LEVEL OF 640,000.

(A) IF THE LEVEL IS MAINTAINED AT 700,000, THEN THE WEST WOULD WITHDRAW 29,000 US SOLDIERS IN PHASE I. BUT BY MAINTAINING THE COMMON CEILING AT 700,000, THE WEST WOULD REDUCE ONLY 2,000 MEN IN PHASE II. IN ADDITION, SINCE FRENCH FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THE EAST WOULD OBJECT THAT THE WEST WAS MAINTAINING A SUPERIORITY OF 60,000 MEN WHICH COULD BE INCREASED AT WILL. THIS OPTION IS NOT NEGOTIABLE.

(B) IF THE LEVEL IS SET AT 640,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE, THEN WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD REMAIN THE SAME AS UNDER THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH (91,000). BUT EASTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INCREASED BY 60,000 TO 309,000. HERE AGAIN, THE EAST WOULD OBJECT THAT THE WEST WAS MAINTAINING A SUPERIORITY OF 60,000 WHICH COULD BE INCREASED AT WILL. THIS OPTION IS ALSO NOT NEGOTIABLE.

7. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF OMITTING FRENCH FORCES WOULD BE TO PROPOSE THAT THE CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT BE A COMMON ONE. IN THIS CASE, THE FIGURE OF 700,000 FOR THE EAST WOULD BE MAINTAINED WHILE, FOR THE WEST, A FIGURE OF 640,000 WOULD BE PROPOSED. THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD REQUIRE EAST-WEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PRESENT NUMERICAL LEVEL OF 60,000 FRENCH SOLDIERS WOULD HOWEVER MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE UP FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE AREA. IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE WEST WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT A TOTAL REDUCTION OF NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF ALL NATO COUNTRIES, A FIGURE WHICH, ACCORDING TO ALLIANCE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS IS THE MAXIMUM WHICH THE ALLIANCE CAN ACCEPT. IN ADDITION, THE UNLIMITED RIGHT OF
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THE FRENCH TO INCREASE WOULD MAKE THE PROPOSAL NOT NEGOTIABLE.

8. IF THE FRENCH REQUIREMENT TO DROP FRENCH FORCES FROM WESTERN DATA IS CARRIED TO THE EXTREME OF PRECLUDING WESTERN NEGOTIATORS FROM QUOTING A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR FRENCH FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, OR EVEN MENTIONING THESE

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FROM US REP MBFR

FORCES, THEN THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO ABANDON THE WESTERN CONCEPT THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER MUST BE THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IN THE CINTRAL ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

9. BUT THE ALLIED POSITION REQUIRES A CONVINCING RATIONALE. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS ARE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE EAST TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO, THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THROUGH MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. ON THE BASIS OF WESTERN DATA, THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE NEARLY THREE TIMES LARGER ON THE EASTERN THAN ON THE WESTERN SIDE. THE EAST HAS AN EASILY UNDERSTANDABLE RATIONALE FOR ITS APPROACH, WHICH IS TO USE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF ALL FORCES AS THE BASIS OF REDUCTIONS THROUGH EQUAL PERCENTAGE CUTS. THIS EASTERN RATIONALE WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED IF THE WESTERN PARITY ARGUMENT HAD TO BE ABANDONED.

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10. THE EXCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA FROM ANY OVERALL LIMITATION COVERING WESTERN FORCES IN

THE AREA WOULD UNDERMINE THE BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS ASSUMPTION IS THAT REDUCTIONS IN ARMED FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL MILITARY MANPOWER IN THAT AREA AND BE ACCOMPANIED BY LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. NEITHER EAST NOR WEST WOULD WANT TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WHICH LIMITED ALL THEIR OWN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA, BUT WHICH LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE OTHER SIDE'S INTRODUCING ANY NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL OF A NON-PARTICIPANT. THE COMMON CEILING IS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

11. IF THE COMMON CEILING SOLUTION TO THE LIMITATION PROBLEM HAD TO BE ABANDONED, A THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO GIVE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THE RIGHT TO MATCH ANY INCREASES WHICH THE FRENCH MIGHT MAKE IN THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA, AND TO GIVE THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THE RIGHT TO MAKE UP FOR ANY FRENCH DECREASES. THIS ALTERNATIVE IS OPEN TO THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIONS:

(A) SUCH MATCHING EASTERN INCREASES COULD BE MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A DEFINITE CEILING ON THE LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AS ENVISAGED BY THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH.

(B) MOREOVER, IF, FOLLOWING SUCH SOVIET INCREASES, FRENCH FORCES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE NO MEANS OF ENSURING THAT SOVIET FORCES WERE CORRESPONDINGLY REDUCED.

(C) THIS SOLUTION IS FAR MORE COMPLEX THAN THE PRESENT WESTERN TREATMENT OF FRENCH FORCES UNDER THE COMMON CEILING AND WOULD ALSO CAUSE THE NEGOTIATORS TO FOCUS ON THE FRENCH ISSUE.

12. THERE ARE ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO EXCLUDING FRENCH FORCES FROM THE COMMON CEILING LIMITATION. THE ALLIES WOULD
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NO LONGER BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGE ALSO JUSTIFIED LARGER EASTERN REDUCTIONS: IF THE ALLIES POINTED TO THE PROXIMITY OF LARGE, UNCONTROLLED FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE EAST COULD POINT TO THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT, UNCONTROLLED FRENCH FORCES ALREADY WITHIN THE AREA. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WOULD ALSO FIND IT HARDER TO ARGUE CONVINCINGLY THAT THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE. ONCE THE PROPOSED OVERALL CEILING EXCLUDED THE FORCES OF ONE MAJOR POTENTIAL PARTNER IN FUTURE WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, THE CASE FOR AVOIDING LIMITATIONS WHICH

COULD INTERFERE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH COOPERATION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED.

13. IN SUM, NO MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE WITH THE EAST IF THE WEST TOOK THE POSITION THAT, SINCE FRANCE WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE INCREASES IN THE LEVEL OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA COULD NOT ABE ADDRESSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. THE ONLY PRACTICAL COURSE WHICH WOULD PRESERVE:

(A) THE CONCEPT OF PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA AS THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS;

(B) THE CONCEPT OF STABILIZING OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE AREA AFTER AN AGREEMENT; AND

(C) THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO ARGUE EFFECTIVELY FOR THESE CONCEPTS WOULD BE TO CONTINUE WITH THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION OF INCLUDING FRENCH FORCES BOTH IN WESTERN DATA AND UNDER A COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH THAT THEIR INTEREST CAN EFFECTIVELY BE MET BY A DISCLAIMER.
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